This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Citations of
Heski Bar-Isaac

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics

Working papers

  1. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2007. "Information Gathering Externalities in Product Markets," Working Papers 07-19, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, 2008. "Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation," Working Papers 08-28, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  2. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Managment," Working Papers 07-29, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. Marc Blatter & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Informational Hold-Up, Disclosure Policy, and Career Concerns on the Example of Open Source Software Development," Working Papers 08-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008. [Downloadable!]

  3. Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2006. "How to Organize Crime," Working Papers 06-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Luís Cabral, 2005. "Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 199-206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2008. "Interrogation Methods and Terror Networks," Working Papers 08-8, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  4. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2004. "Imperfect Competition and Committment," Working Papers 04-09, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1991. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," IDEI Working Papers 5, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  5. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2004. "Something to Prove: Reputation in teams and hiring to introduce uncertainty," Working Papers 04-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2006. "Assortative Matching and Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1553, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2008. "How to Organize Crime," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 75(4), pages 1039-1067, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2006. "How to Organize Crime," Working Papers 06-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Bar-Isaac, Heski, 2005. "Imperfect competition and reputational commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 167-173, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Enrico Sette, 2009. "Sorting, reputation and entry in a market for experts," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 727, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    2. Heski Bar-Isaac & Juanjo Ganuza, 2005. "Teaching to the top and searching for superstars," Working Papers 05-06, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    3. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, 2008. "Reputation and competition: evidence from the credit rating industry," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-051, Harvard Business School, revised Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]

  3. Heski Bar-Isaac, 2003. "Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 231-251, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Subir Bose & Gerhard Orosel & Marco Ottaviani & Lise Vesterlund, 2008. "Monopoly pricing in the binary herding model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 203-241, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    3. Jihong Lee & Qingmin Liu, 2008. "The Dynamics of Bargaining Postures: The Role of a Third Party," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    4. Bose, Subir & Orosel, Gerhard O & Ottaviani, Marco & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "Dynamic Monopoly Pricing and Herding," CEPR Discussion Papers 5003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Did you know? IDEAS is also providing many rankings, for example of authors and institutions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.