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Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation
[Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model]

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  • Chia-Hui Chen
  • Junichiro Ishida
  • Wing Suen

Abstract

High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.

Suggested Citation

  • Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2021. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation [Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model]," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1981-2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:19:y:2021:i:4:p:1981-2021.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvaa046
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2023. "A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 1-43, February.
    2. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    3. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2022. "Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1225-1260, May.
    4. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2020.
    5. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2022. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences: The Case of Discrete Types," ISER Discussion Paper 1166, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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