Inside the black box of collective reputation
AbstractThe literature on collective reputation is still in its infancy. Despite the existence of a (limited) number of valuable theoretical works studying the process of collective reputation building, there is still no comprehensive analysis of this concept. In addition, due to data limitation, there are no empirical studies testing the determinants of group reputation. This work intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of reputational equilibria within coalitions of agents. In order to do so, we design a static and dynamic (over 30 years) study on the universe of coalitions of companies, within the wine market, looking at the role exerted by the characteristics of the coalition itself (its age and size), the rules set and the actions put forward by the group of agents in order to reach and maintain a certain level of collective reputation, and the context in which they operate. Results shed new lights into this ubiquitous phenomenon.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica in its series Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica with number 89/2011.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 15 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
reputation; collective reputation; asymmetric information; quality standards; wine.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2011-06-11 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-06-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-NET-2011-06-11 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Raphaël Soubeyran & Elodie Rouvière, 2008. "Collective Reputation, Entry and Minimum Quality Standard," Working Papers 2008.7, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Francesco Venturini, 2011. "Product variety, product quality, and evidence of Schumpeterian endogenous growth: a note," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 93/2011, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica.
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