Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?
AbstractThis paper analyzes a model where investors use a credit rating to decide whether to finance a firm. The rating quality depends on the unobservable effort exerted by a credit rating agency (CRA). We analyze optimal compensation schemes for the CRA that differ depending on whether a social planner, the firm, or investors order the rating. We find that rating errors are larger when the firm orders it than when investors do. However, investors ask for ratings inefficiently often. Which arrangement leads to a higher social surplus depends on the agents' prior beliefs about the project quality. We also show that competition among CRAs causes them to reduce their fees, put in less effort, and thus leads to less accurate ratings. Rating quality also tends to be lower for new securities. Finally, we find that optimal contracts that provide incentives for both initial ratings and their subsequent revisions can lead the CRA to be slow to acknowledge mistakes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 18923.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
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Other versions of this item:
- Natalia Kovrijnykh & Anil Kashyap, 2013. "Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?," 2013 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 1125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-04-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-04-06 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2013-04-06 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2013-04-06 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2013-04-06 (Operations Research)
- NEP-REG-2013-04-06 (Regulation)
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