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Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation

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Author Info
Skreta, Vasiliki
Veldkamp, Laura

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Abstract

Many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial-market turmoil. We develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation. In the model, asset issuers can shop for ratings--observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable--before auctioning their assets. When assets are simple, agencies' ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low. When assets are sufficiently complex, ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges. Thus, an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings, despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset's true quality. Increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem. Switching to an investor-initiated ratings system alleviates the bias, but could collapse the market for information.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBW-4W91PXW-1/2/71ce136eed23c166ae662395a6def20b
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Monetary Economics.

Volume (Year): 56 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (July)
Pages: 678-695
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Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:56:y:2009:i:5:p:678-695

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505566

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Related research
Keywords: Rating agencies Information acquisition Disclosure;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
  2. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Credible Ratings," Working Papers tecipa-219, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Heski Bar-Isaac & Guillermo Caruana & Vicente Cunat, 2007. "Information Gathering Externalities in Product Markets," Working Papers 07-19, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. James Bullard & George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2005. "Near-rational exuberance," Working Paper Series 555, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Joël Peress, 2004. "Wealth, Information Acquisition, and Portfolio Choice," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 879-914. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Erik Eyster & Matthew Rabin, 2005. "Cursed Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1623-1672, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, 2008. "Reputation and competition: evidence from the credit rating industry," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-051, Harvard Business School, revised Jul 2009. [Downloadable!]
  8. Boyan Jovanovic, 1982. "Truthful Disclosure of Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 36-44, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Morgan, John & Stocken, Phillip C, 2003. " An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 183-203, Spring.
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  10. Bolton, Patrick & Freixas, Xavier & Shapiro, Joel, 2007. "Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 297-330, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Emmanuel Farhi & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2008. "Fear of Rejection? Tiered Certification and Transparency," NBER Working Papers 14457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Laura Veldkamp, 2003. "Media Frenzies in Markets for Financial Information," Working Papers 03-20, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Benabou, Roland & Laroque, Guy, 1992. "Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 921-58, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Gadi Barlevy & Pietro Veronesi, . "Information Acquisition in Financial Markets," CRSP working papers 360, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    Other versions:
  16. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Peyrache, Eloïc & Quesada, Lucía, 2005. "The Ownership of Ratings," CEPR Discussion Papers 5432, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Hellwig, Martin F., 1980. "On the aggregation of information in competitive markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 477-498, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dion Bongaerts & K.J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2009. "Multiple Ratings and Credit Spreads," NBER Working Papers 15331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Didier Sornette & Ryan Woodard, 2009. "Financial Bubbles, Real Estate bubbles, Derivative Bubbles, and the Financial and Economic Crisis," Quantitative Finance Papers 0905.0220, arXiv.org. [Downloadable!]
  3. Efraim Benmelech & Jennifer Dlugosz, 2009. "The Credit Rating Crisis," NBER Working Papers 15045, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

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