Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options
AbstractThis paper examines the role of credit rating agencies in the subprime crisis that triggered the 2007-08 financial turmoil. We focus on two aspects of ratings that contributed to the boom and bust of the market for structured debt: rating inflation and coarse information disclosure. The paper discusses how regulation can be designed to mitigate these problems in the future. Our preferred policy is to require rating agencies to be paid by investors rather than by issuers and to grant open and free access to data about the loans or securities underlying structured debt products. A more modest (but less effective) approach would be to retain the “issuer pays” model but require issuers to pay an upfront fee irrespective of the rating, ban “rating shopping”, and prescribe a more complete format for the information that rating agencies must disseminate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 239.
Date of creation: 06 Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in Economic Policy, 401-431, April 2010
credit rating agencies; securitization; default; liquidity; crisis; transparency;
Other versions of this item:
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2009. "Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options," EIEF Working Papers Series 0912, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Sep 2009.
- Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2009. "Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 7556, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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