We present a model in which issuers of structured bonds choose coarse and opaque ratings to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity or even causing it to freeze. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We analyze various types of public intervention -- requiring transparency for rating agencies, providing liquidity to distressed banks or supporting secondary market prices -- and find that their welfare implications are quite different. Finally, transparency is greater if issuers restrain the issue size, or tranche it so as to sell the more information-sensitive tranche to sophisticated investors only.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993.
" Security Design,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1349-78, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Arnoud W A Boot & Anjan V Thakor, 1992.
"Security Design,"
CEPR Financial Markets Paper
0020, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG.
Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2009.
"The Credit Ratings Game,"
NBER Working Papers
14712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2009.
"The Credit Ratings Game,"
Economics Working Papers
1149, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2009.
"The Credit Ratings Game,"
NBER Working Papers
14712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2009.
"The Credit Ratings Game,"
Economics Working Papers
1149, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
[Downloadable!]