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Why Do Firms Smooth Earnings?

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Author Info
Anand Mohan Goel (University of Michigan)

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Abstract

We explain why a firm may smooth reported earnings. Greater earnings volatility leads to a bigger informational advantage for informed investors over uninformed investors. If sufficiently many current shareholders are uninformed and may need to trade in the future for liquidity reasons, an increase in the volatility of reported earnings will magnify these shareholders' trading losses. They will, therefore, want the manager to smooth reported earnings as much as possible. Empirical implications are drawn out that link earnings smoothing to managerial compensation contracts, uncertainty about the volatility of earnings, and ownership structure.

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File URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?JB760107
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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.

Volume (Year): 76 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 151-192
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:76:y:2003:i:1:p:151-192

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 2001. "The Many Faces of Information Disclosure," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 1021-57.
    Other versions:
  2. Franklin Allen, . "Stock Markets and Resource Allocation (Reprint 036)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-92, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  3. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1997. "Financial System Architecture," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(3), pages 693-733.
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  4. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1999. "Diversity of Opinion and Financing of New Technologies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(1-2), pages 68-89, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 75-93, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. DeFond, Mark L. & Park, Chul W., 1997. "Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 115-139, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Subramanyam, K. R., 1996. "The pricing of discretionary accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-3), pages 249-281, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. " Security Design," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1349-78, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Dechow, Patricia M., 1994. "Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance : The role of accounting accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 3-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Brennan, Michael J & Thakor, Anjan V, 1990. " Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 993-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ilan Guttman & Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel, 2003. "Adding the Noise: A Theory of Compensation-Driven Earnings Management," Discussion Paper Series dp355, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2005. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value," NBER Working Papers 11241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jonas Dovern & Carsten-Patrick Meier & Johannes Vilsmeier, 2008. "How Resilient is the German Banking System to Macroeconomic Shocks?," Kiel Working Papers 1419, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. [Downloadable!]
  4. Daniel Pérez & Vicente Salas-Fumás & Jesús Saurina, 2006. "Earnings and capital management in alternative loan loss provision regulatory regimes," Banco de España Working Papers 0614, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
  5. Jesus, Saurina & Gabriel, Jimenez, 2006. "Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation," MPRA Paper 718, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gabriel Jiménez & Jesús Saurina, 2006. "Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(2), May. [Downloadable!]
  7. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2004. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," NBER Working Papers 10471, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Hsiang-Lin Chih & Chung-Hua Shen & Feng-Ching Kang, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Investor Protection, and Earnings Management: Some International Evidence," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 179-198, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gabriel Jiménez & Jesús Saurina, 2005. "Credit cycles, credit risk, and prudential regulation," Banco de España Working Papers 0531, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
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