Securitization, Transparency and Liquidity
We present a model in which issuers of asset backed securities choose to release coarse information to enhance the liquidity of their primary market, at the cost of reducing secondary market liquidity or even causing it to freeze. The degree of transparency is inefficiently low if the social value of secondary market liquidity exceeds its private value. We analyze various types of public intervention — mandatory transparency standards, provision of liquidity to distressed banks or secondary market price support — and find that they have quite different welfare implications. Finally, transparency is greater if issuers restrain the issue size, or tranche it so as to sell the more information-sensitive tranche to sophisticated investors only.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2012|
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