Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options
AbstractThis paper examines the role of credit rating agencies in the subprime crisis that triggered the 2007-08 financial turmoil. The focus of the paper is on two aspects of ratings that contributed to the boom and bust of the market for asset-backed securities:rating inflation and coarse information disclosure. The paper discusses how regulation can be designed to mitigate these problems in the future. The suggestion is that regulators should require rating agencies to be paid by investors rather than by issuers (or at least constrain the way they are paid by issuers) and force greater disclosure of information about the underlying pool of securities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) in its series EIEF Working Papers Series with number 0912.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision: Sep 2009
Other versions of this item:
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 2009. "Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options," CSEF Working Papers 239, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2009. "Credit Ratings Failures and Policy Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 7556, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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