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Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?

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Author Info
Luís Cabral ()

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Abstract

This note comments on Feuerstein's (Feuerstein, Switgard, “Collusion in industrial economics: A survey,” forthcoming in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2005) survey of collusion theory. I start by presenting evidence from a recent real-world collusion case: the lysine industry. Based on this, I point out a few areas where collusion theory can improve: (a) the problem of equilibrium choice (bargaining over each firm's share), which is especially important in asymmetric oligopolies; (b) the problem of equilibrium implementation, including in particular communication in an asymmetric information context; and (c) the relation between price wars and collusion. I conclude with a few notes on policy issues, namely leniency programs and cartel detection strategies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10842-005-4869-4
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 199-206
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:5:y:2005:i:3:p:199-206

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Related research
Keywords: collusion; cartels; public policy;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, 2000. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 207-236, Summer.
    Other versions:
  2. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Joseph E Harrington & Jr Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Economics Working Paper Archive 509, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Meghan Busse, 2002. "Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 298-318, Summer.
  5. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000334, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-65, Autumn.
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  9. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Meghan R. Busse, 2002. "Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm281, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  11. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2008. "How to Organize Crime," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 75(4), pages 1039-1067, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2006. "How to Organize Crime," Working Papers 06-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Fershtman, Chaim & Pakes, Ariel, 2005. "Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work," CEPR Discussion Papers 5024, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Rejoinder," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 235-239, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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