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Re-Thinking Reputation

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  • Andrew Mell
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    Abstract

    Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.� In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date.� Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world.� We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the history that would be available and how it might be used.� This new approach can explain cycles in reputations.

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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/working_papers/paper565.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 565.

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    Date of creation: 01 Sep 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:565

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    Related research

    Keywords: Reputation; monitoring; expectations formation;

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    1. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, 03.
    2. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2009. "Limited Records and Reputation," Research Papers 2030, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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