AbstractEconomic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.� In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date.� Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world.� We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the history that would be available and how it might be used.� This new approach can explain cycles in reputations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 565.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Reputation; monitoring; expectations formation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-09-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-09-16 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-09-16 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems,"
1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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PIER Working Paper Archive
03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003.
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