Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Limited Records and Reputation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Liu, Qingmin

    (University of Pennsylvania)

  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

We study the impact of limited records on reputation dynamics, that is, how the set of equilibria and equilibrium payoffs changes in a model in which one long-lived player faces a sequence of short-lived players who observe only limited information about past play (the last K periods of the long-lived player's actions). We show that limited records dramatically change the equilibrium behavior. Moreover, with limited records, equilibria in games with complete and incomplete information are strikingly different (in contrast to games with complete records). We also obtain a lower bound for equilibrium payoffs at any moment of the game, not only at the beginning, thus providing a stronger long-run prediction.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2030.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2030.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2030

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Fax: (650)725-6750
Email:
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  2. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Discussion Papers 1507, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2012. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  5. Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Reputation with Analogical Reasoning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000304, David K. Levine.
  6. Andrew Mell, 2011. "Re-Thinking Reputation," Economics Series Working Papers 565, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2030. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.