The Enemy You Can't See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks
AbstractWe examine the optimal disruption of dark (covert and illegal) networks. Of central importance is that an interventionist will generally have incomplete information about the dark network's architecture. We derive the optimal disruption strategy in a stylized model of dark network intervention with incomplete information and show how it combines features of two types of disruption considered in the literature: random failure and targeted attacks. In particular, the optimal disruption strategy encourages greater risk as less of the architecture is observed. A laboratory experiment finds that subjects tasked with disrupting a dark network qualitatively mimic the theoretical predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 121307.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Terrorism; Crime; Intervention; Defense;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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