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Fight or Flight?

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Author Info

  • Cary Deck

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, USA
    Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA)

  • Roman M. Sheremeta

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA)

Abstract

This article examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle, while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the authors’ experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in the overall number of battles in the contest. However, the defender engages in the contest significantly more often than predicted and the aggregate expenditures by both parties exceed predicted levels. Moreover, both defenders and attackers actually increase the intensity of the fight as they approach the end of the contest.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Journal of Conflict Resolution.

Volume (Year): 56 (2012)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1069-1088

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Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:56:y:2012:i:6:p:1069-1088

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Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/

Related research

Keywords: Colonel Blotto; conflict resolution; weakest link; game of siege; multiperiod resource allocation; experiments;

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References

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  2. Roman M. Sheremeta & Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests," Working Papers 09-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  3. Price, Curtis R. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Endowment effects in contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 217-219, June.
  4. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers 09-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
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  8. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock J. & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 2688, CESifo Group Munich.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2013. "On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict," IZA Discussion Papers 7492, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Shields, Timothy W., 2014. "When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 96-108.
  3. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Lee, Dongryul & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2013. "Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 94-103.
  4. Erik O. Kimbrough & Jared Rubin & Roman M. Sheremeta & Timothy Shields, 2013. "Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution," Working Papers 13-11, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  5. Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman & Yates, Andrew, 2012. "Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum," MPRA Paper 43031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," Working Papers 13-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

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