Analysis of a Strategic Terror Organization
AbstractThe authors model a terrorist organization's choice over the scale and planning horizon of terror attacks and the consequences for the organization's evolution. The organization can engage in short-term attacks planned and executed in a single period, characterized by a low fixed cost and relatively high marginal cost, and longer term attacks planned and executed over two periods, having a high fixed cost but relatively low marginal cost. Longer term attacks require more resources and cause more damage if successful. Successful attacks increase the organization's size; in addition, the organization has a natural growth rate. Attacks can fail because of failed execution or counterterror interdiction. In a two-period version of this model, the authors analyze the terror organization's attack decisions. They use simulations to characterize optimal strategies and explore their implications for the growth of the organization. The authors identify a set of strategic regimes, and the results show that they always occur in a fixed order as a function of the organization's initial strength.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Volume (Year): 54 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/
terrorism; terrorist decision making; evolution of terrorist organizations; counterter-rorism; mathematical models of terrorism;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- S. Blomberg & Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler, 2011. "Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 441-463, December.
- Michael McBride & David Hewitt, 2012.
"The Enemy You Can't See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks,"
121307, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- McBride, Michael & Hewitt, David, 2013. "The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 32-50.
- Jonathan Feinstein & Edward Kaplan, 2011. "Counterterror intelligence operations and terror attacks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 281-295, December.
- Kaplan, Edward H., 2013. "Staffing models for covert counterterrorism agencies," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 2-8.
- Hendel, Ulrich, 2012. ""Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't": Mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations," Discussion Papers in Economics 13998, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.