Optimal Sales Schemes for Network Goods
AbstractThis paper examines the optimal sequencing of sales in the presence of network externalities. A firm sells a good to a group of consumers whose payoff from buying is increasing in total quantity sold. The firm selects the order to serve consumers so as to maximize expected sales. It can serve all consumers simultaneously, serve them all sequentially, or employ any intermediate scheme. We show that the optimal sales scheme is purely sequential, where each consumer observes all previous sales before choosing whether to buy himself. A sequential scheme maximizes the amount of information available to consumers, allowing success to breed success. Failure can also breed failure, but this is made less likely by consumers’ desire to influence one another’s behavior. We show that when consumers differ in the weight they place on the network externality, the firm would like to serve consumers with lower weights first. Our results suggests that a firm launching a new product should first target independent-minded consumers who can serve as opinion leaders for those who follow.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 13-11.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2013
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Product launch; Network externality; Sequencing of sales;
Other versions of this item:
- Alexei Parakhonyak & Nick Vikander, 2013. "Optimal sales schemes for network goods," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics WP BRP 41/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
- M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-12-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-12-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2013-12-29 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-MKT-2013-12-29 (Marketing)
- NEP-NET-2013-12-29 (Network Economics)
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