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Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks

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  • Jack Ochs
  • In-Uck Park

Abstract

We analyze a multi-period entry game among privately informed agents who differ with respect to the number of agents who must enter in order for their own entry to be profitable. In each period agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. There exists a unique equilibrium that approximates any symmetric equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem. Ex-post efficiency is necessarily achieved asymptotically as the population size grows large. These results do not hold if subscribers can reverse their decisions without cost.

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 172782000000000046.

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Date of creation: 28 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000046

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 150-82, February.
  2. Steven A. Matthews, 2008. "Achievable Outcomes of Dynamic Contribution Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jun 2011.
  3. Steven A. Matthews, 2006. "Smooth Monotone Contribution Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  4. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif, 2014. "Platform selection in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 168-177.
  5. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Monopoly Sale of a Network Good," ISER Discussion Paper 0794, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  6. Gary Biglaiser & Jacques CreÌmer & AndreÌ Veiga, 2013. "Migration Between Platforms," Working Papers 13-18, NET Institute.
  7. Alexei Parakhonyak & Nick Vikander, 2013. "Optimal sales schemes for network goods," HSE Working papers WP BRP 41/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  8. COLLA, Paolo & GARCIA, Filomena, 2004. "Technology adoption with forward looking agents," CORE Discussion Papers 2004041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2013. "Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 77-89.
  10. Matthews, Steven A., 2013. "Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  11. Steven A. Matthews, 2008. "Achievable Outcomes in Smooth Dynamic Contribution Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  12. Greaker, Mads & Midttømme, Kristoffer, 2013. "Optimal Environmental Policy with Network Effects: Is Lock-in in Dirty Technologies Possible?," Memorandum 15/2013, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  13. Mads Greaker & Kristoffer Midttømme, 2014. "Optimal Environmental Policy with Network Effects: Will Pigovian Taxation Lead to Excess Inertia?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4759, CESifo Group Munich.

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