Adoption of Standards Under Uncertainty

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Adoption of Standards Under Uncertainty

Author Info

Michael Ostrovsky () (Harvard University)
Michael Schwarz () (Harvard University and Stanford University)

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Michael Ostrovsky

Abstract

The presence of noise in compliance times may have a critical impact on the selection of new technological standards. A technically superior standard is not necessarily viable because an arbitrarily small amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. We introduce the concept of a firm's "support ratio," defined as a function that depends only on characteristics of that firm. We show that for sufficiently patient firms, the viability of a standard does not depend on the distribution of noise in compliance times. The criterion for the viability of a standard is that the sum of support ratios of all firms be smaller than one. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from https://pubs3.rand.org/cgi-bin/rje/pdf.cgi.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 816-832
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:4:p:816-832

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Paper
- Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2003. "Adoption of Standards under Uncertainty," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2013, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2006. "Dynamic Network Formation," Working Papers 233, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
Frederik Schmidt, 2008. "Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 189-208, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2004. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]

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