Adoption of Standards Under Uncertainty
AbstractThe presence of noise in compliance times may have a critical impact on the selection of new technological standards. A technically superior standard is not necessarily viable because an arbitrarily small amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. We introduce the concept of a firm's "support ratio," defined as a function that depends only on characteristics of that firm. We show that for sufficiently patient firms, the viability of a standard does not depend on the distribution of noise in compliance times. The criterion for the viability of a standard is that the sum of support ratios of all firms be smaller than one.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2003. "Adoption of Standards under Uncertainty," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 2013, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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