Adoption of Standards under Uncertainty
AbstractThe presence of noise in compliance times may have a critical impact on the selection of new technological standards. A technically superior standard is not necessarily viable because an arbitrarily small amount of noise may render coordination on that standard impossible. The criterion for the viability of a standard is that the sum of \support ratios" of all players must be smaller than one, where \support ratio" is de ned as the ratio of the rm's per-period cost of supporting the standard to the per-period gross bene t that the rm receives after all players comply with the standard.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 2013.
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