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Dynamic Coordiantion Games

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Author Info
Gale, D.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 13.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:bostec:13

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Keywords: game theory ; economic models;

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  1. Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray, 2003. "Contracts and Externalities: How Things Fall Apart," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000235, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1600, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Mar 2007. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Christophe Chamley, 2003. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 603-621, June. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marc Rysman, 2003. "Adoption Delay in a Standards War," Working Papers 03-11, NET Institute, revised Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
  5. Juan Ruiz, 2003. "Another Perspective on Planned obsolescence: is there really too much Innovation?," Industrial Organization 0302001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tatsuhiro SHICHIJO & Yuji NAKAYAMA, 2004. "A Way To Sell Goods With Network Externalities," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 711, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  7. Syngjoo Choi & Douglas Gale & Shachar Kariv, 2006. "Sequential Equilibrium in Monotone Games: Theory-Based Analysis of Experimental Data," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000278, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Jay Surti, 2004. "Rational Speculation, Financial Crises, and Optimal Policy Responses," IMF Working Papers 04/25, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Juan Ruiz, 2003. "Machine replacement, Network Externalities and Investment Cycles," Macroeconomics 0302001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. In-Uck Park, 2003. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/085, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Ascending Auction: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000845, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Steven A. Matthews, 2006. "Smooth Monotone Contribution Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  13. Robert Kurzban & Mary Rigdon & Bart Wilson, 2008. "Incremental approaches to establishing trust," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 370-389, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Dynamic Auctions: Uniqueness and Robustness to Private Information," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000771, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001000, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Jakub Steiner, 2006. "Coordination Cycles," ESE Discussion Papers 162, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

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