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The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation

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Author Info
Torun Dewan
David P. Myatt
Abstract

Party activists wish to (i) advocate the best policy and yet (ii) unify behind a common party line. An activist`s understanding of his environment is based on the speeches of party leaders. A leader`s influence, measured by the weight placed on her speech, increases with her judgement on policy (sense of direction) and her ability to convey ideas (clarity of communication). A leader with perfect clarity of communication enjoys greater influence than one with a perfect sense of direction. Activists can choose how much attention to pay to leaders. A necessary condition for a leader to monopolize the agenda is that she is the most coherent communicator. Sometimes leaders attract more attention by obfuscating their messages. A concern for party unity mitigates this incentive; when activists emphasize following the party line, they learn more about their environment.

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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 311.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:311

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Keywords: Leadership Direction Coordination Communication Oligarchy

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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