Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change
AbstractThis article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change. There is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime's ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that, taken at face-value, makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is. This coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium's comparative statics. Holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens, if the per-unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow. In contrast, if the number of signals increases, so that both total signal precision and the regime's costs of manipulation rise together, then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Review of Economic Studies.
Volume (Year): 80 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Chris Edmond, 2011. "Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1125, The University of Melbourne.
- Chris Edmond, 2011. "Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change," NBER Working Papers 17395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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