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“Large” vs. “small” players: A closer look at the dynamics of speculative attacks

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Author Info
Geir H. Bjønnes () (Norwegian School of Management(BI))
Steinar Holden () (University of Oslo and Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway))
Dagfinn Rime () (Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway))
Haakon O.Aa. Solheim () (Ministry of Trade and Industry)

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Abstract

What is the role of “large players” like hedge funds and other highly leveraged institutions in speculative attacks? In recent theoretical work, large players may induce an attack by an early move, providing information to smaller agents. In contrast, many observers argue that large players are in the rear. We propose a model that allows both the large player to move early in order to induce speculation by small players, or wait so as to benefit from a high interest rate prior to the attack. Using data on net positions of “large” (foreigners) and “small” (locals) players,we find that large players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone (NOK) during the1990s: The ERM-crisis of 1992, the NOK-pressure in 1997, and after the Russian moratorium in1998. In 1998 there was a contemporaneous attack on the Swedish krona (SEK) in which large players moved early. Interest rates did not increase in Sweden so there was little to gain by a delayed attack.

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Paper provided by Norges Bank in its series Working Paper with number 2005/13.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 21 Nov 2005
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Handle: RePEc:bno:worpap:2005_13

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Related research
Keywords: Speculative attacks; microstructure; international finance; large players;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Akram, Q. Farooq & Rime, Dagfinn & Sarno, Lucio, 2006. "Arbitrage in the Foreign Exchange Market: Turning on the Microscope," SIFR Research Report Series 42, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Axelson, Ulf & Strömberg, Per & Weisbach, Michael S., 2007. "Why are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds," SIFR Research Report Series 49, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Fedyk, Yuriy & Walden, Johan, 2007. "High-Speed Natural Selection in Financial Markets with Large State Spaces," SIFR Research Report Series 52, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Bjönnes, Geir H. & Holden, Steinar & Rime, Dagfinn & Solheim, Haakon O.Aa., 2005. "'Large' vs. 'Small' Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks," SIFR Research Report Series 38, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Axelson, Ulf & Baliga, Sandeep, 2007. "Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes," SIFR Research Report Series 54, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
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