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Why are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds

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Author Info
Axelson, Ulf () (Swedish Institute for Financial Research)
Strömberg, Per () (Swedish Institute for Financial Research)
Weisbach, Michael S. (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign)

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Abstract

This paper presents a model of the financial structure of private equity firms. In the model, the general partner of the firm encounters a sequence of deals over time where the exact quality of each deal cannot be credibly communicated to investors. We show that the optimal financing arrangement is consistent with a number of characteristics of the private equity industry. First, the firm should be financed by a combination of fund capital raised before deals are encountered, and capital that is raised to finance a specific deal. Second, the fund investors' claim on fund cash flow is a combination of debt and levered equity, while the general partner receives a claim similar to the carry contracts received by real-world practitioners. Third, the fund will be set up in a manner similar to that observed in practice, with investments pooled within a fund, decision rights over investments held by the general partner, and limits set in partnership agreements on the size of Particular investments. Fourth, the model suggests that incentives will lead to overinvestment in good states of the world and underinvestment in bad states, so that the natural industry cycles will be multiplied. Fifth, investments made in recessions will on average outperform investments made in booms.

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Paper provided by Institute for Financial Research in its series SIFR Research Report Series with number 49.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 15 Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:hhs:sifrwp:0049

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Related research
Keywords: LBO funds; capital structure; private equity; ex ante financing; ex post financing; incentives in private equity;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Steven Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, 2003. "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital," NBER Working Papers 9807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Steven N. Kaplan & Berk A. Sensoy & Per Strömberg, 2005. "What Are Firms? Evolution from Birth to Public Companies," NBER Working Papers 11581, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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    Other versions:
  7. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Lerner, Joshua & Schoar, Antoinette, 2003. "The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence from Private Equity," Working papers 4378-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Kaplan, Steven N & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. "The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 313-57, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kaplan, Steve & Schoar, Antoinette, 2004. "Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital Flows," Working papers 4446-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Alexander Ljungqvist & Matthew Richardson & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2008. "The Investment Behavior of Buyout Funds: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 14180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Sundaram, Rangarajan K. & Yermack, David, 2006. "Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation," SIFR Research Report Series 43, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
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  28. Bortolotti, Bernardo & de Jong, Frank & Nicodano, Giovanna & Schindele, Ibolya, 2004. "Privatization and Stock Market Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 4449, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  29. Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 2000. "Money chasing deals? The impact of fund inflows on private equity valuation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 281-325, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alexander Ljungqvist & Matthew Richardson & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2008. "The Investment Behavior of Buyout Funds: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 14180, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Zwart, G.J. de & Frieser, B. & Dijk, D.J.C. van, 2007. "A Recommitment Strategy for Long Term Private Equity Fund Investors," Research Paper ERS-2007-097-F&A Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bottazzi, L. & Da Rin, M. & Hellmann, T., 2008. "What is the Role of Legal Systems in Financial Intermediation? Theory and Evidence," Discussion Paper 2008-014, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ayako Yasuda & Andrew Metrick, 2007. "The economics of private equity funds," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct. [Downloadable!]
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