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Currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence

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  • Daniëls, Tijmen R.
  • Jager, Henk
  • Klaassen, Franc

Abstract

While virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it, this is seldom modelled explicitly. We add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of Morris and Shin (American Economic Review 88, 1998). With an endogenous defence, actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements. Nevertheless, our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium. It provides additional insights. For instance, the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 85 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 14-24

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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:85:y:2011:i:1:p:14-24

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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Keywords: Currency crisis Interest rate defence Global game Strategic substitutes;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jutta Dönges & Frank Heinemann & Tijmen R. Daniëls, 2013. "Crossing Network versus Dealer Market: Unique Equilibrium in the Allocation of Order Flow," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2013-007, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  2. Tijmen Daniëls, 2009. "Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 417-439, December.
  3. Michal Grajek & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2009. "Regulation and investment in network industries: Evidence from European telecoms," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-09-004, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
  4. Ulrike Busch & Dieter Nautz, 2010. "Controllability and Persistence of Money Market Rates along the Yield Curve: Evidence from the Euro Area," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11, pages 367-380, 08.
  5. Katja Hanewald & Thomas Post & Helmut Gr�ndl, 2011. "Stochastic Mortality, Macroeconomic Risks and Life Insurer Solvency," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 458-475, July.
  6. Roland Strausz, 2009. "The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-040, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  7. Barbara Choros & Wolfgang Härdle & Ostap Okhrin, 2009. "CDO Pricing with Copulae," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-013, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  8. Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Jager, Henk & Klaassen, Franc, 2011. "Currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 14-24, September.
  9. Tijmen R. Daniels & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen, 2008. "Defending against Speculative Attacks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-090/2, Tinbergen Institute, revised 06 Apr 2009.
  10. Maria Grith & Wolfgang Härdle & Juhyun Park, 2009. "Shape invariant modelling pricing kernels and risk aversion," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-041, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  11. Christian Bauer & Philip Ernstberger, 2014. "The Dynamics of Currency Crises---Results from Intertemporal Optimization and Viscosity Solutions," Research Papers in Economics 2014-06, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
  12. Barbara Choroś & Wolfgang Härdle & Ostap Okhrin, 2009. "CDO and HAC," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-038, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  13. Stefan Ried, 2009. "Putting Up a Good Fight: The Galí-Monacelli Model versus “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics”," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-020, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

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