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Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time

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  • Yin-Wong Cheung

    (University of California, Santa Cruz)

  • Daniel Friedman

    (University of California, Santa Cruz)

Abstract

We examine speculative attacks in a controlled laboratory environment featuring continuous time, size asymmetries, and varying amounts of public information. Attacks succeeded in 233 of 344 possible cases. When speculators have symmetric size and access to information: (a) weaker fundamentals increase the likelihood of successful speculative attacks and hasten their onset, and (b) contrary to some theory, success is enhanced by public access to information about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals. The presence of a larger speculator further enhances success, and experience with large speculators increases small speculators¡¦ response to the public information. However, giving the large speculator increased size or better information does not significantly strengthen his impact.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research in its series Working Papers with number 072009.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hkm:wpaper:072009

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Keywords: Currency Crisis; Speculative Attack; Laboratory Experiment; Coordination Game; Pre-emption; Large Player;

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Cited by:
  1. Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2012. "Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 97-116.
  2. Dina Tasneem & Jim Engle-Warnick & Hassan Benchekroun, 2014. "An Experimental Study of a Common Property Renewable Resource Game in Continuous Time," CIRANO Working Papers 2014s-09, CIRANO.
  3. Robin Pope & Reinhard Selten & Sebastian Kube & Jürgen von Hagen, 2006. "Experimental Evidence on the Benefits of Eliminating Exchange Rate Uncertainties and Why Expected Utility Theory causes Economists to Miss Them," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena, University of Siena 010, University of Siena.
  4. Makoto Nirei & Theodoros Stamatiou & Vladyslav Sushko, 2012. "Stochastic Herding in Financial Markets Evidence from Institutional Investor Equity Portfolios," BIS Working Papers 371, Bank for International Settlements.
  5. Taketa, Kenshi & Suzuki-Löffelholz, Kumi & Arikawa, Yasuhiro, 2009. "Experimental analysis on the role of a large speculator in currency crises," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 602-617, October.
  6. Schotter, Andrew & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2009. "On the dynamics and severity of bank runs: An experimental study," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 217-241, April.
  7. Olga Shurchkov, 2013. "Coordination and learning in dynamic global games: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 313-334, September.
  8. Ciril Bosch-Rosa, 2014. "That's how we roll: an experiment on rollover risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2014-048, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.

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