Speculative Attacks and the Information Role of the Interest Rate
AbstractThis paper models currency attacks as carried out by speculators who condition their actions on private signals about the state and on the market-clearing interest rate. Besides affecting speculators' payoffs, this interest rate also provides an endogenous public signal. For a plausible type of investment strategies, the dual role of the interest rate allows the model to explain abrupt and intense speculative attacks solely via economic fundamentals, without resorting to sunspot variables. This result underlies a novel policy implication: An official intervention in the foreign exchange market may reinforce a currency peg by influencing the precision of public information. (JEL: D82, D84, F31) (c) 2007 by the European Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Journal of the European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 5 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
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