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The Role of Large Players in Currency Crises

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  • Giancarlo Corsetti
  • Paolo Pesenti
  • Nouriel Roubini

Abstract

During recent episodes of financial turmoil some policy makers voiced concerns about aggressive, and possibly manipulative, practices by highly leveraged institutions in emerging markets. This paper addresses these concerns by reconsidering in detail, at both theoretical and empirical levels, the role of large players in currency crises. The first part of the study discusses analytical results from different models of speculative attack, suggesting that the presence of agents with market power can increase a country's vulnerability to a crisis and make other investors more aggressive in their position-taking. Both size and reputation for quality of information matter in determining large players' impact on the market. The second part of the study presents evidence on the correlation between exchange rate movements and major market participants' net currency positions, and delves into a comparative analysis of several recent crisis episodes in Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Australia, and South Africa in light of the previous theoretical results.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8303.

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Date of creation: May 2001
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Publication status: published as Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, Nouriel Roubini. "The Role of Large Players in Currency Crises," in Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey A. Frankel, editors, "Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets" University of Chicago Press (2002)
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8303

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Cited by:
  1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:7:y:2003:i:6:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Matthew Pritsker, 2005. "Large investors: implications for equilibrium asset, returns, shock absorption, and liquidity," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Andryakov Alexander & Gurvich Evsey, 2002. "A Model of the Russian Crisis Development," EERC Working Paper Series 02-03e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
  4. VERGARI, Cecilia, 2004. "Herd behaviour, strategic complementarities and technology adoption," CORE Discussion Papers 2004063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Cees G. H. Diks & Dennis P. J. Botman, 2005. "The Role of Domestic and Foreign Investors in a Simple Model of Speculative Attacks," IMF Working Papers 05/205, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Lin, Anchor Y. & Swanson, Peggy E., 2004. "International equity flows and developing markets: the asian financial market crisis revisited," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 55-73, February.
  7. Killeen, William P. & Lyons, Richard K. & Moore, Michael J., 2006. "Fixed versus flexible: Lessons from EMS order flow," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 551-579, June.
  8. Basant K. Kapur, 2007. "Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Volatility: Singapore’s Experience," NBER Chapters, in: Capital Controls and Capital Flows in Emerging Economies: Policies, Practices and Consequences, pages 575-608 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Tullio Gregori, 2009. "Currency crisis duration and interest defence," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(3), pages 256-267.
  10. Pritha Mitra, 2006. "Post-Crisis Recovery: When Does Increased Fiscal Discipline Work?," IMF Working Papers 06/219, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart & Carlos A. V�gh, 2003. "The Unholy Trinity of Financial Contagion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 51-74, Fall.
  12. Mei Li & Frank Milne, 2007. "The Role of Large Players in a Dynamic Currency Attack Game," Working Papers 1148, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  13. Cecilia Vergari, 2005. "Herd Behaviour in Adoption of Network Technologies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 86(2), pages 161-182, November.
  14. Giancarlo Corsetti & Bernardo Guimaraes & Nouriel Roubini, 2003. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance," NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Elif Cepni & Nezir Kose, 2006. "Assessing the Currency Crises in Turkey," Central Bank Review, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, vol. 6(1), pages 37-64.
  16. Bannier, Christina E., 2005. "Big elephants in small ponds: Do large traders make financial markets more aggressive?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1517-1531, November.
  17. Taketa, Kenshi & Suzuki-Löffelholz, Kumi & Arikawa, Yasuhiro, 2009. "Experimental analysis on the role of a large speculator in currency crises," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 602-617, October.

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