Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues

Contents:

Author Info

  • W.H. Buiter
  • G Corsetti
  • P Pesenti

Abstract

Most interpretations of the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992-93 ignore the key role played by structural policy spillovers among European countries, and overlook the effects of coordination (or lack thereof) of monetary and exchange rate policies among the countries making up the periphery of the system. This paper provides a simple analytical framework, able to encompass the recent literature on currency crises, while developing it by bringing out the decisive role of the strategic interactions among national policy makers in a multi-country monetary and exchange rate game. In contrast to an approach that focuses exclusively on country-specific issues, a systemic view is ultimately able to unravel more coherently, and more convincingly, the "puzzles" of the ERM crisis.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/DP0321.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0321.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0321

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Corsetti, G. & Cavallari, L., 1996. "Policy Making and Speculative Attacks in Models of Exchange Rate Crises: A Synthesis," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center 752, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  2. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1995. "The mirage of fixed exchange rates," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 95-08, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  4. Alesina, Alberto F & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "On the Feasibility of a One- or Multi-Speed European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 677-700, August.
  6. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1993. "The Unstable EMS," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1), pages 51-144.
  7. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August.
  8. Currie,David & Levine,Paul, 2009. "Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521104609, 9.
  9. Cooper, Richard N., 1985. "Economic interdependence and coordination of economic policies," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1195-1234 Elsevier.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0321. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.