Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues
AbstractMost interpretations of the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992-93 ignore the key role played by structural policy spillovers among European countries, and overlook the effects of coordination (or lack thereof) of monetary and exchange rate policies among the countries making up the periphery of the system. This paper provides a simple analytical framework, able to encompass the recent literature on currency crises, while developing it by bringing out the decisive role of the strategic interactions among national policy makers in a multi-country monetary and exchange rate game. In contrast to an approach that focuses exclusively on country-specific issues, a systemic view is ultimately able to unravel more coherently, and more convincingly, the "puzzles" of the ERM crisis.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0321.
Date of creation: Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP
Other versions of this item:
- Buiter, W.H. & Corsetti, G.M. & Pesenti, P.A., 1998. "Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues," Princeton Studies in International Economics 84, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- Buiter, Willem H & Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo, 1996. "Interpreting the ERM Crisis: Country-Specific and Systemic Issues," CEPR Discussion Papers 1466, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Currie,David & Levine,Paul, 2009.
"Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521104609, December.
- Currie,David & Levine,Paul, 1993. "Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521441964, December.
- Corsetti, G. & Cavallari, L., 1996. "Policy Making and Speculative Attacks in Models of Exchange Rate Crises: A Synthesis," Papers 752, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Cooper, Richard N., 1985. "Economic interdependence and coordination of economic policies," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 23, pages 1195-1234 Elsevier.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.