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Is There a Safe Passage to EMU? Evidence on Capital Controls and a Proposal

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  • Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz.

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on the effects of capital controls. We show that controls have been associated with significant differences in macroeconomic behaviour, especially in monetary policy. While they have not prevented speculative attacks, they have provided the breathing space needed to organize orderly realignments. We also provide evidence on the channels through which speculative attacks operate, showing that bank lending to non-residents is a key transmission mechanism. We conclude with a discussion of measures that mimic some of the effects of controls as a way of easing the transition to European Monetary Union. Non-interest-bearing deposit requirements on lending to non-residents are proposed as a third-best route to monetary union.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers with number C95-047.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1995
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbcd:c95-047

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Cited by:
  1. Antoine Magnier & Benoît Cœuré, 1996. "Crédibilité et fondamentaux macro-économiques au sein du SME : un examen empirique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 123(2), pages 113-146.
  2. Kenen, Peter B., 1995. "What have we learned from the EMS crises?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 449-461, October.
  3. Barry Eichengreen & Andrew K. Rose & Charles Wyplosz, 1994. "Speculative Attacks on Pegged Exchange Rates: An Empirical Exploration with Special Reference to the European Monetary System," NBER Working Papers 4898, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Christian Wolff & Stefan T.M. Straetmans & Roald J. Versteeg, 2008. "Are Capital Controls in the Foreign Exchange Market Effective?," LSF Research Working Paper Series 08-12, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
  5. Ramkishen Rajan, 1998. "Restraints On Capital Flows : What Are They?," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22383, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  6. Straetmans, Stefan & Versteeg, Roald & Wolff, Christian C, 2008. "Are Capital Controls in the Foreign Exchange Market Effective?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6727, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Ramkishen Rajan, 2010. "Sand in the Wheels of International Finance: Revisiting the Debate in Light of the East Asian Mayhem," Working Papers id:2686, eSocialSciences.
  8. Weller, Christian E., 1999. "Financial crises after financial liberalization: Exceptional circumstances or structural weakness?," ZEI Working Papers B 15-1999, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  9. Mariassunta Giannetti, 2004. "Old and Modern Currency Crises: Short-Term Liabilities, Speculative Attacks and Business Cycles," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 133, Econometric Society.

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