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International coordination of macroeconomic policies: still alive in the new millennium?

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In this paper we provide two building blocks for an analysis of international policy coordination: (1) a survey of models of policy coordination, and (2) an account of experience with policy coordination among the G-7 countries and within Europe since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System. Using these building blocks, we investigate the correspondence between the models and experience and attempt to draw lessons for both the modelers and the practitioners. We find that the correspondence is close enough that the models help in analyzing several instances of actual policy coordination, but that the correspondence could be even closer. As for lessons for modelers, we suggest that they devote more attention to the analysis of information exchange, a key feature of practical policy coordination; to the coordination of different types of policies; to the ramifications of political divisions within countries; and to the implications of market irrationality and speculative bubbles. As for lessons for policy makers, we suggest that they give more consideration to the choice of their ultimate objectives, in particular to whether the current account should always be close to balance; to achieving better internal policies; and to the greater use of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool.

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  • Brian M. Doyle & Joseph E. Gagnon & Dale W. Henderson & Laurence H. Meyer, 2002. "International coordination of macroeconomic policies: still alive in the new millennium?," International Finance Discussion Papers 723, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:723
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    Cited by:

    1. Eichengreen, Barry & Taylor, Alan M., 2003. "The Monetary Consequences of A Free Trade Area of the Americas," CEPR Discussion Papers 3909, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Barry Eichengreen, 2008. "Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances? Can there be one?," Working Papers 69, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.
    3. Eichengreen, Barry, 2013. "Currency war or international policy coordination?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 425-433.
    4. Masson, Paul R. & Pattison, John C., 2009. "Financial Regulatory Reform: Using Models of Cooperation to Evaluate Current Prospects for International Agreement," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 119-136.
    5. David D. VanHoose, 2004. "The New Open Economy Macroeconomics: A Critical Appraisal," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 193-215, April.
    6. Leonor Coutinho, 2003. "Fiscal Policy in the New Open Economy. Macroeconomics and Prospects for Fiscal Policy Coordination," Economics Working Papers 021, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes.
    7. AkIn, Cigdem & Kose, M. Ayhan, 2008. "Changing nature of North-South linkages: Stylized facts and explanations," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-28, February.

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