This paper studies the impact of changes in the extent to which fiscal policy is distortionary on the short-run macroeconomic tradeoffs facing fiscal policymakers in an era of budget equilibrium. It does so in an open economy framework, that we use to interpret U.S.-European policy interactions. Our analysis features both fiscal and monetary policy to study how changes in the extent to which fiscal policy is distortionary affect the interaction between central banks and fiscal authorities, both intra- and internationally. In addition, strategic interactions among policymakers³and the tradeoffs they face³are affected by the exchange-rate regime. When government spending is funded through distortionary taxes alone³a scenario that we call anti-Keynesian, changing spending moves both inflation and employment in the desired direction following a worldwide supply shock. Smaller and more open economies face a more favorable tradeoff than large relatively closed ones. Under a managed exchange rate regime, European governments face a better tradeoff than under flexible rates, but the improvement is more significant for the country that controls the exchange rate. When both European countries in our model join in a monetary union, the country that had control of the exchange rate under the managed exchange rate regime faces a worse tradeoff, while the tradeoff improves for the country that controlled money supply. In the fully Keynesian case, in which taxes are non-distortionary, all countries face the same positively sloped tradeoff regardless of the exchange-rate regime. Increases in spending cause both output and inflation to rise. When fiscal policy is neither fully anti-Keynesian nor fully Keynesian, the governmentsê tradeoffs lie in between the extreme cases, and the exact position depends on the extent to which fiscal policy is Keynesian. Under all European exchange-rate regimes, small increases in the fraction of firms that are subject to distortionary taxation at home are beneficial when the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment, while a less Keynesian fiscal policy abroad is harmful. Governments in the U.S. and Europe will want the ECB and the Fed to coordinate their reactions to an unfavorable supply shock, while monetary policymakers will have little incentive to do so. Intra-European fiscal cooperation can be counterproductive, whereas cooperation between governments and central banks inside each continent can be beneficial. Our study suggests that, if governments are concerned mainly about the relation between fiscal policy and the business cycle, maintaining some fiscal distortions may be optimal.
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Length: 54 pages Date of creation: 22 Nov 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:467
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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