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Engineering Trust - Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information

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Author Info

  • Gary E. Bolton

    ()
    (Department of Supply Chain & Information Systems, Pennsylvania State University)

  • Ben Greiner

    ()
    (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)

  • Axel Ockenfels

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Cologne)

Abstract

Reciprocal feedback distorts the production and content of reputation information, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Data from eBay and other sources combined with laboratory data provide a robust picture of how reciprocity can be guided by changes in the way feedback information flows through the system, leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust and more efficient trade.

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File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2009-02.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2009-02.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2009-02

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Keywords: market design; reputation; trust; reciprocity; eBay;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real World Markets? Fair Bargaining and Competitive Bidding on EBay," Working Paper Series in Economics 36, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 24 Feb 2011.
  2. Aperjis, Christina & Miao, Yali & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2011. "Variable Temptations and Black Market Reputations," Working Paper Series 11-020, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  3. Marianne Lumeau & David Masclet & Thierry Pénard, 2013. "Reputation and Social (Dis)approval in Feedback Mechanisms: An Experimental study," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201343, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  4. Benjamin Edelman & Micahel Luca, 2014. "Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com," Harvard Business School Working Papers 14-054, Harvard Business School.

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