"Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price." Copyright 2006, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing.
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Klein, Tobias & Lambertz, Christian & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Stahl, Konrad O., 2006.
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Tobias J. Klein & Christian Lambertz & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2005.
"Last Minute Feedback,"
Discussion Papers
62, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich, revised Mar 2006.
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Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007.
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