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Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction

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Author Info
Ockenfels, Axel
Roth, Alvin E.

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Abstract

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 55 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 297-320
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:2:p:297-320

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bajari, Patrick & Hortacsu, Ali, 2003. " The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 329-55, Summer.
  2. Gary Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms?," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-25, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ladislav Wintr, 2008. "Some evidence on late bidding in eBay auctions," Research series 200801-25, National Bank of Belgium. [Downloadable!]
  2. Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "New Institutional Structures on the Internet: The Economic Design of Online Auctions," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard Cox, 2005. "Bid Increments in Second-Price Sealed Bid Auctions," Microeconomics 0503007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Sascha Füllbrunn, 2007. "Collusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions," FEMM Working Papers 07025, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
  5. Tim Grebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2006. "How eBay Sellers set “Buy-it-now” prices - Bringing The Field Into the Lab," Discussion Papers 181, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2006. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay," Working Papers 06-32, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2008. "Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real World Markets? Fair Bargaining and Competitive Bidding on EBay," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Luis Cabral & Ali Hortacsu, 2004. "The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay," NBER Working Papers 10363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. John Duffy & M. Utku Unver, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents: A Study on Market Design," Computational Economics 0510001, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. MINGLI ZHENG & Robert McMillan & SAJID ANWAR, 2005. "Bidding Behavior in Competing Auctions: Evidence from eBay," Microeconomics 0505001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger & Markus Walzl, 2007. "On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2001. "The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-33, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  14. Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2004. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Working Paper Series in Economics 7, University of Cologne, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Stryszowska, M., 2004. "Late and multiple bidding in competing second price internet auctions," Discussion Paper 43, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  17. Steve Anderson & Daniel Friedman & Garrett Milam & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Buy it Now: A Hybrid Internet Market Institution," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1023, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Anderson, Steven & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Seller strategies on eBay: Does size matter?," MPRA Paper 4324, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  19. Anderson, Steven & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Buy it now: A hybrid market institution," MPRA Paper 4322, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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