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Discretion and bias in performance evaluation

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Author Info
Prendergast, Canice
Topel, Robert

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-45BC5JH-1F/2/085cc250651977047209461e84304474
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 37 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (April)
Pages: 355-365
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:37:y:1993:i:2-3:p:355-365

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  4. Julia Angerhausen, 2005. "Evaluation Frequency and Forgetful Principals," Discussion Papers in Economics 05_06, University of Dortmund, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "U-type versus J-type Tournaments as Alternative Solutions to the Unverifiability Problem," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Zhijun, 2008. "Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations," Working Papers 08-27, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jennifer Kunz, 2008. "Do we measure what we get?," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 188, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  9. Smeets, Valérie & Ierulli, Kathryn & Gibbs, Michael, 2006. "Mergers of Equals & Unequals," Working Papers 06-8, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Bouwens, J.F.M.G. & Lent, L.A.G.M. van, 2003. "Effort and selection effects of incentive contracts," Discussion Paper 130, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Otten, J.A., 2008. "Theories on executive pay. A literature overview and critical assessment," MPRA Paper 6969, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. John S Heywood & Colin Green, 2008. "Profit Sharing and the Quality of Relations with the Boss," Working Papers 005698, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  13. Moers,Frank, 2001. "Discretion and Bias in Performance Evaluation: The Impact of Diversity and Subjectivity," Research Memoranda 025, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  14. Canice Prendergast & Robert H. Topel, 1993. "Favoritism in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 4427, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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