Is Reputation Good or Bad? An Experiment
AbstractWe investigate the impact of reputation in a laboratory experiment. We do so by varying whether the past choices of a long-run player are observable by the short-run players. Our framework allows for reputation to have either a beneficial or a harmful effect on the long-run player. We find that reputation is seldom harmful and its beneficial effects are not as strong as theory suggests. When reputational concerns are at odds with other-regarding preferences, we find th latter overwhelm the former. (JEL C91, D12, D82, D83, Z13)
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 100 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Li, Lingfang (Ivy) & Xiao, Erte, 2010. "Money Talks? An Experimental Study of Rebate in Reputation System Design," MPRA Paper 22401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2008.
"Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6624, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2010. "Consumer networks and firm reputation: A first experimental investigation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 242-244, August.
- Steffen Huck & Gabriele K. Lünser & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2007. "Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation," Discussion Papers 07-28, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Viceisza, Angelino, 2008.
"An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption:,"
IFPRI discussion papers
774, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- Jeffrey V. Butler & Enrica Carbone & Pierluigi Conzo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012.
"Reputation and Entry,"
Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena
045, University of Siena.
- Butler, Jeffrey & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2012. "Reputation and Entry," SITE Working Paper Series 21, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Jeffrey V. Butler & Enrica Carbone & Pierluigi Conzo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012. "Reputation and Entry," EIEF Working Papers Series 1215, Einaudi Institute for Economic and Finance (EIEF), revised Nov 2012.
- Luis Cabral & Lingfang (Ivy) Li, 2012. "A Dollar for Your Thoughts: Feedback-Conditional Rebates on eBay," Working Papers 12-13, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.