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The Influence of Information Externalities on the Value of Reputation Building - An Experiment

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Author Info
Gary E. Bolton
Axel Ockenfels

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Abstract

We observe that information externalities arise in sequential equilibrium of the chain store game such that the amount of reputation building among partners differs from that among strangers. No matching effects are predicted for the trust game. Our experiment confirms the qualitative chain store prediction, but information externalities also show up in the trust game.

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Paper provided by University of Cologne, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 17.

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Date of creation: 15 Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:kls:series:0017

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  1. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gary Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms?," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-25, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  4. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1993. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 325-51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Andreoni, James A & Miller, John H, 1993. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(418), pages 570-85, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Brandts, Jordi & Figueras, Neus, 2003. "An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 89-115, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Cripps, Martin W & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1995. "Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games without Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1401-19, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Neral, John & Ochs, Jack, 1992. "The Sequential Equilibrium Theory of Reputation Building: A Further Test," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1151-69, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Yun Joo Jung & John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1994. "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 72-93, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996. "Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 387-410, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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