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The Credit Rating Market - Options for Appropriate Regulation

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  • Andreas Freytag

    ()
    (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena and University of Stellenbosch)

  • Martin Zenker

    (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Graduate Programme "Soziale Marktwirtschaft")

Abstract

The principal agent problem is one of the major issues of the credit rating agency market. Is it possible to solve the prevailing incentive problem of the market and contemporaneously satisfy the reputation demand of the investors? This paper presents an option for regulating the credit rating agency market more effectively. The market shall be coordinated through a central allocation office, which is acting as a mediator between both contractual parties. The paper develops a game theoretical approach that considers reputation as one of the most important aspects within the market. After analysing the status quo two policy options are discussed on a game theoretical basis. The main result is that the incorporation of a mediator, which awards the contracts based on a lottery drawing, would help to solve conflicts of interests. The incentive to inflate ratings decreases significantly. Moreover, rating shopping option becomes impossible. Two possible positive side effects for smaller CRAs and new incumbents are the increase of market share as well as reputation. Therefore, the market competition should be affected positively, too.

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File URL: http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_hlj39-2012.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena in its series Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series with number 2012-39.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hlj:hljwrp:39-2012

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Web page: http://www.gfinm.de

Related research

Keywords: credit rating agencies; regulation; reputation; rating inflation; rating shopping;

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  1. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2012. "The Credit Ratings Game," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 85-112, 02.
  2. Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, 2010. "How did increased competition affect credit ratings?," NBER Working Papers 16404, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Eloïc Peyrache & Lucía Quesada, 2009. "The ownership of ratings," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 234-257.
  4. Vasiliki Skreta & Laura Veldkamp, 2008. "Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 08-28, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. Doherty, Neil A. & Kartasheva, Anastasia V. & Phillips, Richard D., 2012. "Information effect of entry into credit ratings market: The case of insurers' ratings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 308-330.
  6. Mathis, Jérôme & McAndrews, James & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 657-674, July.
  7. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joel Shapiro, 2011. "Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 120-24, May.
  8. Lawrence J. White, 2010. "Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 211-26, Spring.
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