The Rise of Economics in Competition Policy: A Canadian Perspective
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- Marcel Boyer & Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, 2017. "The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1489-1524, December.
- Marcel Boyer & Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, 2017. "The rise of economics in competition policy: A Canadian perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(5), pages 1489-1524, December.
- Boyer, Marcel & Ross, Thomas W. & Winter, Ralph, 2017. "The Rise of Economics in Competition Policy:: A Canadian Perspective," TSE Working Papers 17-869, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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Cited by:
- Marcel Boyer & Anne Catherine Faye & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2017.
"Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining,"
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2017s-20, CIRANO.
- Boyer, Marcel & Faye, Anne Catherine & Kotchoni, Rachidi, 2017. "Challenges and Pitfalls in Cartel Policy and Fining," TSE Working Papers 17-852, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Marcel Boyer & Anne Catherine Faye & Éric Gravel & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2019. "Guiding Principles in Setting Cartel Sanctions (The Working Paper Version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2019s-18, CIRANO.
- Kargas, Antonios & Argyroulis, Vasileios & Varoutas, Dimitrios, 2023. "Mergers and acquisitions in telecommunications market: a simultaneous equations approach to study Structure, Conduct and Performance," 32nd European Regional ITS Conference, Madrid 2023: Realising the digital decade in the European Union – Easier said than done? 277984, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
- Thomas W. Ross & Ralph A. Winter, 2021. "A Canadian Perspective on Vertical Merger Policy and Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(2), pages 229-253, September.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2018-01-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HIS-2018-01-01 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-LAW-2018-01-01 (Law and Economics)
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