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Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey

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Author Info
Oliver Budzinski () (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)
Isabel Ruhmer () (Center for Doctoral Studies in Economics (CDSE) University of Mannheim)

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Abstract

Advances in competition economics as well as in computational and empirical methods have offered the scope for the employment of merger simulation models in merger control procedures during the past almost 15 years. Merger simulation is, nevertheless, still a very young and innovative instrument of antitrust and, therefore, its ‘technical’ potential is far from being comprehensively exploited and teething problems in its practical use in the antitrust environment prevail. We provide a classification of state-of-the-art merger simulation models and review their previous employment in merger cases as well as the problems and limitations currently associated with their use in merger control. In summary, merger simulation models represent an important and valuable extension of the toolbox of merger policy. However, they do not qualify as a magic bullet and must be combined with other, more traditional instruments of competition policy in order to comprehensively unfold its beneficial effects.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 200807.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:200807

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Related research
Keywords: merger simulation; merger control; antitrust; oligopoly theory; auction models; mergers & acquisitions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
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