An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft

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An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft

Author Info

Richard J. Gilbert (University of California, Berkeley)
Michael L. Katz (University of California, Berkeley)

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Abstract

We analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects and economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new operating system competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the Java programming language potentially could have lowered. Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0106001.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jun 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0106001

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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 25-44, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Michael Katz & Richard Gilbert, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v Microsoft," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series CPC01-019, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
- Richard Gilbert & Michael Katz, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1013, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
- Richard J. Gilbert and Michael L. Katz., 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Economics Working Papers E01-300, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2001-06-22 (All new papers)
NEP-LAW-2001-06-22 (Law & Economics)
NEP-NET-2001-06-22 (Network Economics)
NEP-REG-2001-06-22 (Regulation)
NEP-TID-2001-06-22 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Richard Gilbert, 2000. "Exclusive Dealing, Preferential Dealing, and Dynamic Efficiency," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 167-184, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
- Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
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Zvi Griliches, 1992. "The Search for R&D Spillovers," NBER Working Papers 3768, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Griliches, Zvi, 1992. " The Search for R&D Spillovers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 94(0), pages S29-47, Supplemen.
Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, 1998. "Measuring The Social Return To R&D," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1119-1135, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, . "Measuring the Social Return to R&D," Working Papers 97002, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2006. "Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets," NBER Working Papers 12604, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Christopher R. Knittel & Victor Stango, 2006. "Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets," Working Papers 06-08, NET Institute, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
Hal R. Varian, 2001. "High-technology industries and market structure," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 65-101. [Downloadable!]
Markus Pasche, 2005. "(Self-)Regulation of a Natural Monopoly via Complementary Goods - the Case of F/OSS Business Models," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 18/2005, Friedrich-Schiller-Universitï¿½t Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultï¿½t. [Downloadable!]
Ilya Segal & Michael Whinston, 2005. "Antitrust in Innovative Industries," NBER Working Papers 11525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Markus Pasche & Sebastian von Engelhardt, 2004. "Volkswirtschaftliche Aspekte der Open-Source-Softwareentwicklung," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft 18/2004, Friedrich-Schiller-Universitï¿½t Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultï¿½t. [Downloadable!]
Stephane Verani, 2006. "Open Source Development in a Differentiated Duopoly," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 06-05, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2005. "Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets," NBER Working Papers 11407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robert E. Litan & Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Policy During the Clinton Administration," Law and Economics 0303003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Marc-Peter Radke, 2001. "Law and Economics of Microsoft vs. U.S. Department of Justice - New Paradigm for Antitrust in Network Markets or Inefficient Lock-In of Antitrust Policy?," Violette Reihe Arbeitspapiere 16-2001, Promotionsschwerpunkt Globalisierung und Beschaeftigung, revised Jun 2001. [Downloadable!]
Steven J. Davis & Jack MacCrisken & Kevin M. Murphy, 2001. "Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating Systems and Platforms," NBER Working Papers 8411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pollock, Rufus, 2005. "The Control of Porting in Two-Sided Markets," MPRA Paper 5023, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2007. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Pollock, R., 2007. "The Control of Porting in Two-Sided Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0754, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2005. "Are Intellectual Property Rights Detrimental to Innovation?," Staff General Research Papers 12267, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
CRAMPES, Claude & LANGINIER, Corinne, 2003. "Following the Follower in the Innovation Game," IDEI Working Papers 216, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]

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