An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft
AbstractWe analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects and economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new operating system competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the Java programming language potentially could have lowered. Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number E01-300.
Date of creation: 01 May 2001
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Gilbert, Richard J & Katz, Michael, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt56f8p06q, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft," Industrial Organization 0106001, EconWPA.
- Gilbert, Richard & Katz, Michael, 2001. "An Economist's Guide to U.S. v Microsoft," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt7kj1x7g9, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-11-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENT-2001-11-05 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-NET-2001-11-05 (Network Economics)
- NEP-TID-2001-11-05 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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