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Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy

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Author Info
McAfee, R Preston
Williams, Michael A

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Abstract

The welfare implications of horizontal mergers are examined in the context of the Cournot-Nash model of M. Perry and R. Porter (1985). Horizontal mergers are more likely to be welfare enhancing the more concentrated is the ownership of the nonmerging firms. Mergers that create a new largest firm, or increase the size of the largest firm, reduce welfare. Copyright 1992 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 181-87
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:40:y:1992:i:2:p:181-87

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  2. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani, 2006. "Horizontal Mergers with Scale Economies," Working Papers 571, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  3. Emilie Dargaud, 2008. "Mergers, cartels and leniency programs : the role of production capacities," Working Papers 0814, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2001. "To Merge Or To License: Implications For Competition Policy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  5. Avalos, Marcos & Schatán, Claudia, 2004. "Condiciones de competencia en el contexto internacional: Cemento, azúcar y fertilizantes en Centroamérica," EGAP Working Papers 2004-08, Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Ciudad de México. [Downloadable!]
  6. Robert Town & Douglas Wholey & Roger Feldman & Lawton R. Burns, 2006. "The Welfare Consequences of Hospital Mergers," NBER Working Papers 12244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Emilie Dargaud, 2007. "Mergers and collusion with asymmetric capacities," Working Papers 0708, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Miguel González-Maestre & Diego Peñarrubia, 2005. "Innovation, merger policy and technology transfer," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(1), pages 181-201, January. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kjell Erik Lommerud & Odd Rune Straume & Lars Sorgard, . "Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 10-00, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
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  11. IVALDI, Marc & JULLIEN, Bruno & REY, Patrick & SEABRIGHT, Paul & TIROLE, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Unilateral Effects," IDEI Working Papers 222, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  12. Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007. "Some economics of horizontal integration in the payments industry," Proceedings – Payments System Research Conferences, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jiawei Chen, 2006. "The Effects of Mergers with Dynamic Capacity Accumulation," Working Papers 060701, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Marie-Laure Allain & Saïd Souam, 2004. "Concentration horizontale et relations verticales," Post-Print hal-00242914_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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