Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in Asymmetric Oral Auctions
AbstractFrom bidding data, we estimate the underlying value distribution for Forest Service timber. We find that bidder values decrease $2/mbf (thousand board feet) with each mile from the tract and that small firms (fewer than 500 employees) have values that are $72/mbf lower than large firms. The empirical value distribution is used to simulate various hypothetical scenarios designed to inform public policy. The most anticompetitive mergers raise price by less than 3%, and a 4% decline in marginal costs through greater merger efficiencies is enough to offset a 1% anticompetitive price increase. Eliminating the SBA set-aside program would raise timber revenues by 15%. A policy of granting bidding preferences to small and more-distant bidders would raise revenue by approximately one-tenth of one percent. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal The Review of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 82 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- How NOT to implement a policy of discrimination
by Luke Froeb in managerial econ on 2012-01-31 22:45:00
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