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Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason"

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Author Info
Arndt Christiansen and Wolfgang Kerber () (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)
Wolfgang Kerber () (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

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Abstract

Abstract: Both in US antitrust and EU competition policy a development to a broader appli-cation of rule of reason instead of per se rules can be observed. In the European discussion the attempt to base competition policy on a "more economic approach" is mainly viewed as im-proving the economic analysis in the assessment of specific cases. In this paper it is shown from a general law and economics perspective that the application of rules instead of focus-sing on case-by-case analyses can have many advantages (less regulation costs, rent seeking and knowledge problems), although an additional differentiation of rules through a deeper assessment can also have advantages in regard to the reduction of decision errors of type I and II. After introducing the notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules, we show - based upon law and economics literature upon the optimal complexity of rules - in a simple model that a competition rule is optimally differentiated, if the marginal reduction of the sum of error costs (as the marginal benefit of differentiation) equals the marginal costs of differen-tiation. This model also allows for a more detailed analysis of the most important determi-nants of the optimal degree of rule-differentia¬tion. From this law and economics perspective, competition policy should consist mainly of (more or less differentiated) rules and should only rarely rely on case-by-case analysis. Therefore the main task of a "more economic ap-proach" is to use economics for the formulation of appropriate competition rules.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series Marburg Working Papers on Economics with number 200606.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:200606

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Related research
Keywords: Competition Policy; European Competition Law; Rule of Reason;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K - Law and Economics
K - Law and Economics
L - Industrial Organization

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, 2005. "General and Specific Legal Rules," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(2), pages 329-, June.
    Other versions:
  2. Baumol, William J & Ordover, Janusz A, 1985. "Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 247-65, May.
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  5. Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1445-1473, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brunetti, Aymo & Kisunko, Gregory & Weder, Beatrice, 1998. "Credibility of Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 353-84, September.
    Other versions:
  7. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
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  16. Mahoney, Paul G, 2001. "The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 503-25, Part I Ju.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, 2008. "On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 0812, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews. [Downloadable!]
  3. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2009. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," Working Papers 82/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jarig Sinderen & Ron Kemp, 2008. "The Economic Effect Of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case Of The Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 365-385, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dieter Schmidtchen, . "Wettbewerbsfreiheit, Per se Verbote und die Rule of Reason – Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild <br> Freedom to compete, per se rules and the rule of r," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1159, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  6. Dieter Schmidtchen, . "Wettbewerbsschutz durch regelgeleitete Wettbewerbspolitik - Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1165, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  7. Henk Don & Ron Kemp & Jarig Sinderen, 2008. "Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 341-348, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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