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Abuse of Market Power

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  • John Vickers

Abstract

How should competition law deal with anti-competitive behaviour by firms with market power? In the light of recent EC and US cases, this is perhaps the most controversial current issue for competition policy. Lax policy would jeopardise the competitiveness of markets, but rigid policy would chill pro-competitive, pro-consumer conduct. This paper gives an economic assessment of evolving legal standards in the area. The importance of developing a stronger economic basis for EC law on abuse of market dominance is stressed. Copyright 2005 Crown copyright.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 115 (2005)
Issue (Month): 504 (06)
Pages: F244-F261

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:115:y:2005:i:504:p:f244-f261

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Arndt Christiansen and Wolfgang Kerber & Wolfgang Kerber, 2006. "Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason"," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200606, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  2. Armstrong, M., 2006. "Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
  3. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9pt7p9bm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Karlinger, Liliane & Motta, Massimo, 2007. "Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters," CEPR Discussion Papers 6258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Alberto Iozzi & Roberta Sestini & Edilio Valentini, 2005. "Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries," CEIS Research Paper 69, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
  6. Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 12867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Stefano Colombo, 2010. "Discriminatory Prices, Predation and Signal-Jamming in a Horizontal Differentiation Model," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 87-104, June.
  8. John Vickers, 2009. "Competition Policy and Property Rights," Economics Series Working Papers 436, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  9. John Vickers, 2007. "Some Economics of Abuse of Dominance," Economics Series Working Papers 376, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Ganslandt, Mattias, 2008. "Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy," Working Paper Series 726, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  11. Wang, Xiuqing & Weldegebriel, Habtu T. & Rayner, Anthony J., 2006. "Price Transmission, Market Power and Returns to Scale," Working Papers 46004, Scottish Agricultural College, Land Economy Research Group.

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