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Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses

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Author Info
Michael J. Mandel
Abstract

The use of economists as expert witnesses and consultants has grown dramatically in recent years, driven by such factors as the explosion of mergers and acquisitions. On the plus side, the expert witness boom will likely lead to better regulatory and legal decisions, while infusing real-world examples into classroom teaching. Yet the growing importance of consulting income could divert time and energy away from academic research and teaching, while impeding intellectual debate. A new standard of behavior for academic economists who serve as expert witnesses and consultants may be needed, including full disclosure of clients.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 113-120
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:2:p:113-120

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  2. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2009. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," Working Papers 82/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2001. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1117, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bruno Frey, 2006. "How Influential is Economics?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 295-311, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. DAHM, Matthias & PORTEIRO, Nicolas, 2003. "The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information," CORE Discussion Papers 2003057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, 2008. "Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals," Working Papers 2008-19, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  9. Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200803, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
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