Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Going for the Gold: Economists as Expert Witnesses

Contents:

Author Info

  • Michael J. Mandel
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The use of economists as expert witnesses and consultants has grown dramatically in recent years, driven by such factors as the explosion of mergers and acquisitions. On the plus side, the expert witness boom will likely lead to better regulatory and legal decisions, while infusing real-world examples into classroom teaching. Yet the growing importance of consulting income could divert time and energy away from academic research and teaching, while impeding intellectual debate. A new standard of behavior for academic economists who serve as expert witnesses and consultants may be needed, including full disclosure of clients.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.13.2.113
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

    Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
    Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
    Pages: 113-120

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:2:p:113-120

    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.2.113
    Contact details of provider:
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

    Related research

    Keywords:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Nicolas Porteiro & Matthias Dahm, 2004. "The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 352, Econometric Society.
    2. Winand Emons, 2005. "Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 392-, September.
    3. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May.
    4. Bruno S. Frey, . "Was bewirkt die Volkswirtschaftslehre?," IEW - Working Papers 024, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-, June.
    6. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2009. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," Working Papers 82/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
    7. Bruno Frey, 2006. "How Influential is Economics?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 295-311, June.
    8. Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, 2008. "Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals," Working Papers 2008-19, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    9. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
    10. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200803, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    11. Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2001. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3587v9sv, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:2:p:113-120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.