The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness
AbstractI will consider the law and economics of the use of economic expert witnesses. After introducing the law governing the use of expert witnesses (including economists), I analyze and respond to several concerns regarding the use of expert witnesses. The first is that expert witnesses paid by the respective parties are bound to be partisans ("hired guns") rather than being disinterested, and hence presumptively truthful, or at least honest, witnesses. A second concern is about intelligibility once the expert's evidence has been admitted. A third concern about expert testimony is that opposing experts often cancel each other out. Supposing that the use of economists' testifying as expert witnesses is here to stay, we should consider how the system might be improved. My major proposal is the greater use of court-appointed experts selected on the arbitration model, but I have two additional proposals.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salop, Steven C, 1987. "Evaluating Uncertain Evidence with Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note for Teachers," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 155-59, Summer.
- James J. Heckman, 1998. "Detecting Discrimination," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 101-116, Spring.
- Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Winand Emons, 2005.
"Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 392-, September.
- Winand Emons, 2001. "Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony," Diskussionsschriften dp0103, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2009.
"Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey,"
82/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Bruno S. Frey, 2000.
"Was Bewirkt die Volkswirtschaftslehre?,"
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik,
Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(1), pages 5-33, 02.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2003.
"Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 259-, June.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society.
- Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2000.
"Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
qt35j9s08h, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2004. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 307-327, May.
- Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, 2011.
"Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 1 - 24.
- Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, 2008. "Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals," Working Papers 2008-19, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Cooter, Robert D. & Emons, Winand, 2001. "Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version]," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3587v9sv, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Yee, Kenton K., 2008. "Dueling experts and imperfect verification," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 246-255, December.
- Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200803, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Bruno Frey, 2006. "How Influential is Economics?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 295-311, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.